Serial Dictatorship: the Unique Optimal Allocation Rule when Information is 
Endogenous

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Serial Dictatorship: the Unique Optimal Allocation Rule when Information is Endogenous

Bade, S. (2015). Serial Dictatorship: the Unique Optimal Allocation Rule when Information is Endogenous. Theoretical Economics, 10(2), 385-410.

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Genre: Journal Article

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Creators:
Bade, Sophie¹, Author

Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688

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Dates: Date issued: 2015

Publication Status: Issued

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Rev. Type: Peer

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Degree: -

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Title: Theoretical Economics

Source Genre: Journal

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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 10 (2) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 385 - 410 Identifier: -